First, if by the “naturalistic fallacy” you mean the whole Humean “is/ought” distinction, then that disitnction applies just as much to Craig’s position as Harris’. Hume explicitly applied his point to theistic positiona. And in any event, the distinction is largely a red herring and can be rebutted easily. It doesn’t offered a serious objection to any moral realist position, including moral naturalism.

Second, if you mean Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy”, then Moore’s point also applies to theism. Some people erroneously think that by “natural” in the “naturalistic fallacy” Moore was specifically talking about moral naturalism. He wasn’t. He was talking about ANY view that used non-moral terminology in discussing moral properties. This includes Craig’s divine command position that uses terminiology involving God’s commands in discussing moral properties. Furthemore, Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is a red herring and fails to rebut moral naturalism, especially what are called “synthetic” moral naturalist positions.

[If you want further background on this, I'd recommend checking out either Charles Pigden's or Richard Joyce's work on this. The blog "Philosophical Disquisitions" has a fairly good summary of one of Pigden's articles. Neither Pigden nor Joyce advocate moral naturalism or moral non-naturalism. Joyce is a moral nihilist and moral skeptic, and Pigden is a moral error theorist and a moral skeptic. So they aren't criticizing Hume and Moore out of some interest in defending their own positions. They just both recognize the failings of the whole "is/ought" point and Moore's naturalistic fallacy]

Third, I get that some theists like to cite some atheists like Rosenberg and Ruse when discussing moral arguments for God’s existence. This makes no sense to me. Most atheist philosophers I know of, including evolutionary naturalists and moral nihilists, reject Craig’s first premise. Examples include [I'll stick with the moral error theorists/moral skeptics for ease; otherwise, the list would go on for awhile]: Richard Garner, Ian Hinckfuss, Richard Joyce, Charles Pigden, Joshua Greene, Jonas Olson, etc. Garner puts it beautifully when he writes:

“Mackie says that ‘if the requisite theological doctrine could be defended,’ and he did not think that it could be, we might be able to defend ‘a kind of objective ethical prescriptivity’ (Ethics, p. 48). This is far from obvious. Even God only supplies a most unusual subjective source (or Subjective Source) of value or obligation.”

In fact, Ruse’s argument against moral objectivism has nothing to do with God’s existence or premise 1 of Craig’s argument. Instead, it’s an explanatory argument that hinges on Occam’s razor. One can be an evolutionary naturalist (as I am) and easily rebut Ruse’s argument without mentioning a God, simply by noting that the moral properties supervene on some of the properties he includes in his naturalistic explanation.

In any event, given that most evolutionary naturalists, including moral nihilists / moral skeptics / moral subjectivists, would reject premise 1 of Craig’s argument, I think it makes no sense to cite some of them as if that gives anyone a reason to accept the first premise. To make the point sharper, here’s an an easy challenge:

Before you cited Rosenberg and Ruse. Could you point out ANY passage in their work that supports premise 1 of Craig’s moral argument?

Note that giving me a passage where they advocate moral subjectivism / moral nihilism/ …, or claim that their own position (or evolutionary naturalism or ….) implies moral subjectivism/atheism, won’t help. Pointing out that atheism implies not-X does not show that theism implies X. After all, the above passage from Garner shows that atheists need not think theism implies moral objectivism, and philosophers regularly categorize theistic meta-ethical positions such as divine command theory, divine attitude theories, etc. as moral subjectivism.

So what you instead need to give me to meet the challenge is a passage where Ruse or Rosenberg say that if objective moral properties exists, then God exists; or claim that contrapositive: if it is not the case that God exists, then it is not the case that objective moral properties exist. I’m pretty sure you won’t find such a passage in Ruse’s work, given what I’ve read of his writings on meta-ethics. And both men obviously know of atheistic versions of non-naturalism and naturalism that imply moral objectivism. They simply don’t advocate those positions. But as long as they think these alternative views are more plausible than the theistic alternative, then they can easily reject premise 1.

Here’s a quick definition of moral subjectivism: moral subjectivism involves making the truth of moral statements dependent on a mind’s views on the matter, where “views” can include stuff such as attitudes, beliefs, commands, etc. The lone exception to this relates to the views of a victim with respect to stuff that’s their’s; that wouldn’t be subjectivism and accounts for stuff like rape, stealing, etc. that, by definition, go against the informed preferences of the victim. There are a couple more details that would need to be fleshed out, but I think this is a decent working definition of moral subjectivism.

So “ontologically grounding” moral properties in God’s views would be moral subjectivism, just as “ontologically grounding” moral properties in an idel observer would be moral subjectivism. That’s why, for example, divine command theory is recognized as a version of moral subjectivism. It makes the rightness and wrongness of rape depend on God’s views; specifically, God’s commands. It therefore really confuses me when a divine command theorist like Craig advocates a moral argument for God;s existence from objective morality, while presupposing a moral subjectivist/non-objectivism position.

In any event, I was just curious about how you “ontologically ground” moral properties? Are they grounded in the natural world (which is my position, by the way)? Are they non-natural? Divine? Is the question irrelevant since morality does not need any “grounding for moral properties”?

Thanks for your insightful post.

Well, it’s not clear at all, because I think this claim is simply mistaken. You conflate ontology and epistemology. As explained, the claim to *know* that morality is objective is taken as properly basic in Criag’s argument. The ontology of that objective morality is not.

“Belief in objective reality is properly basic precisely because there is no grounding for the existence of objective reality, and yet we cannot function except for that belief.”

I’m not exactly sure what this means. I do agree, however, that, as Plantinga himself explains, we all take the existence of an objective reality external to our own minds as a properly basic belief because we cannot function otherwise. But it’s properly basic not because it lacks an *ontological* ground, but because we can’t make anything more than a probabilistic logical argument for it. This is, again, the distinction between epistemology and ontology, or being and knowing. My instinct here, again, is that you’re conflating the two in your statements, and thereby missing exactly how Craig’s argument really works.

“2) Plantinga and Craig claim that belief in God is properly basic. Not only is this considered entirely sufficient grounds for belief in God, it is used to justify such beliefs even in the face of all kinds of challenging or difficult evidence (the Problem of Evil, for example). They assert that belief in God is properly basic precisely to avoid having to ground it further. It shifts the burden of proof to those who would deny the existence of God.”

I think this statement is pretty unfair to Plantinga and Craig, especially the latter. Craig has spent his academic career expounding on various arguments for the existence of God, not avoiding them. It seems to me that even a cursory look at his published work would make that obvious.

Second, as you yourself admit, Craig (and Plantinga as well) have spent quite a bit of effort on the Problem of Evil (a problem that can only exist in the context of an objective moral standard, not in a naturalistic model). So, your whole second point is mistaken, I believe.

“The root of my argument is to assert that naturalists are entitled to make exactly the same move in the case of objective morality.”

This again, is where you conflate. It’s perfectly legitimate to, as some other naturalistic philosophers do, take belief in an objective morality as properly basic. The problem is then explaining the ontology of the morality that is taken for granted…and this is something that Harris cannot do, and that other naturalists admit simply cannot be done in a naturalistic framework…hence Craig’s argument…and hence my contention that if you’re going to successfully counter Craig, you’d need to attack, not accept his 2nd premise.

“We do not need to find an ontological grounding in order to assert that belief in a naturalistic objective morality is rational, and we need not submit to a demand that morality be rooted in anything transcendent.”

Properly basic means that the “belief” is rational, *even if you cannot, at that time, explain it.* It does not mean, however, if that belief is true, then there is a logically coherent and plausible ontology that necessarily exists. Craig’s argument is that only a transcendent ground can sustain the claim of objectivity, and I have yet to see any naturalistic argument that can do that. Instead the best you can achieve is a tautology in which any notion of distinctly moral properties disappears.

“It is this move that entitles the naturalist to act “as if” morality is objective, just as we’re entitled to act “as if” reality is objective.”

But no one disputes this, and it’s irrelevant to the validity of Craig’s argument.

Hitchens used to challenge theists to “Name one ethical statement made, or one ethical action performed, by a believer that could not have been uttered or done by a nonbeliever.” The answer is obviously that there is none. But that entirely misses the point.

Anyone can behave as though objective morality exists. The question is what sort of metaphysic is necessary FOR objective morality to exist. The question is whether or not one’s metaphysic is logically consisten with one’s “properly basic” belief in an objective morality.

“Beyond that, we may be tempted to seek to ground a particular naturalistic view of objective morality.”

Tempted? Indeed…we might desire a logically coherent explanation as to how such a thing could possibly (and really) exist.

“And on the face of it, naturalists have a harder row to hoe there.”

On this we agree.

“But theists aren’t in any better position when it comes to *particular* moral principles, because they rely on beliefs on a *particular* God.”

But Parker, this is an entirely different question, correct? You’re making an apples and oranges comparison that just doesn’t work in this context. Craig, as you’re aware, is open to any plausible theory of exactly how individuals move *beyond* their properly basic belief in objective morality to the discovery of the particulars.

Theists are in an infinitely (and I use the word quite consciously) better position to have a plausible ground for an objective morality than a naturalist, because some sort of transcendent ground is *necessary* for objective moral properties per se to exist. The naturalist has no similarly plausible ground and can *only* equate moral language with empirical phenomena. This means that distinct moral properties do not even exist. Moral language is just that…a different vocabulary we use to describe empirical phenomena that we subjectively desire.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, a good number of naturalist/atheist philosophers accept that and run with it. They’re contention is that, yes, on our terms objective morality cannot exist, but we regard maintaining the *illusion* that is does as being preferable to destroying it, because we subjectively prefer the utilitarian or hedonistic outcomes possible in that context to those that would result in a culture where that illusion is abandoned. They’re essentially saying, “yes, there cannot be any objective morality, but we as a species to do the best with what we’ve got,”

“Dr. Craig’s particular objective standard isn’t any better grounded that Harris’s, though admittedly for different reasons.”

I admit I don’t follow you here at all. IF Craig’s first two premises are true, then a transcendent ground is logically necessary, and he’s made his case.

You can attack either of those premises to refute him. As I’ve said, the first appears to me to be unassailable, because the existence of objective and *distinct* moral properties appears to me to be impossible in a purely naturalistic metaphysic, but possible in one in which there is a transcendent reality.

The second premise is what is attacked by those atheistic philosophers who agree that naturalism cannot support an objective morality. Therefore, on their view, objective morality is an illusion that we have evolved for whatever reason, but we need to be grown ups and acknowledge that it doesn’t really exist.

“Belief in a *transcendent* objective morality is properly basic. I’ll grant that, in that it’s rational to believe in it, even if it’s not true.”

You do agree, do you not, that this is not something that either Plantinga or Craig would say?

“In this case, the ontological argument is tautological.”

In Craig’s argument it is not.

“But, belief in a *naturalistic* objective morality is also properly basic. So the naturalist isn’t defeated by Dr. Craig’s argument.”

Again, your conflation is evident. Belief in objective morality is what’s properly basic to Craig…not the metaphysics of that belief.

To defeat his argument, you need to fatally undermine either premise 1 or premise 2, not dodge them.

Belief in a *transcendent* objective morality is properly basic. I’ll grant that, in that it’s rational to believe in it, even if it’s not true. In this case, the ontological argument is tautological.

But, belief in a *naturalistic* objective morality is also properly basic. So the naturalist isn’t defeated by Dr. Craig’s argument.

There are two reasons for this, having to do with the way Plantinga and Dr. Craig use “properly basic.”

1) Belief in objective reality is properly basic. Philosophers have attempted to ground objective reality in something transcendent, and they haven’t been particularly successful. I recall reading Popper describe a solipsistic philosopher who would turn around as quickly as possible in order to catch the world rendering itself for the benefit of her senses. If we had a satisfactory transcendent grounding for the existence of objective reality, then there really wouldn’t be much need for the “properly basic” defense. Belief in objective reality is properly basic precisely because there is no grounding for the existence of objective reality, and yet we cannot function except for that belief.

2) Plantinga and Craig claim that belief in God is properly basic. Not only is this considered entirely sufficient grounds for belief in God, it is used to justify such beliefs even in the face of all kinds of challenging or difficult evidence (the Problem of Evil, for example). They assert that belief in God is properly basic precisely to avoid having to ground it further. It shifts the burden of proof to those who would deny the existence of God.

The root of my argument is to assert that naturalists are entitled to make exactly the same move in the case of objective morality. We do not need to find an ontological grounding in order to assert that belief in a naturalistic objective morality is rational, and we need not submit to a demand that morality be rooted in anything transcendent.

It is this move that entitles the naturalist to act “as if” morality is objective, just as we’re entitled to act “as if” reality is objective.

Beyond that, we may be tempted to seek to ground a particular naturalistic view of objective morality. And on the face of it, naturalists have a harder row to hoe there. But theists aren’t in any better position when it comes to *particular* moral principles, because they rely on beliefs on a *particular* God. No one, theistic or otherwise, has at their disposal a well-known, transcendent, objective standard on which to judge a particular act. Dr. Craig cannot, for example, prove that the 9/11 hijackers were morally wrong without proving that his interpretation of God is the right one.

This was the point of the later parts of my post. Holding a properly basic belief in objective morality does not entitle us to much of anything at all, whether or not there is some transcendent moral standard. Dr. Craig concedes the “gradual and fallible” nature of moral apprehension.

Dr. Craig’s particular objective standard isn’t any better grounded that Harris’s, though admittedly for different reasons.

> The ontological argument, even if true, is utterly superfluous to the existence of objective morality, if belief in objective morality is properly basic.

Two problems:

1) your statement here is simply wrong. Saying that *belief* in objective morality is properly basic doesn’t render the question of exactly how it’s grounded superfluous, irrelevant or meaningless. In fact, it does exactly the opposite. Saying that the belief objective morality is properly basic means that one is justified with that belief as a *starting point* (i.e., I don’t need to argue my claim to *know* that objective morality exists), but, if that’s the case, then there’s a *necessary question* about the ontology of that objective morality. The claim to know objective morality exists is properly basic, the ontological explanation for it is not.

I don’t know how to put it any more simply for you.

2) Craig’s argument isn’t designed to establish the ontology of morality, it’s to establish the existence of God given a properly basic belief about the objective status of morality. As I stated earlier, his first premise is a claim (and a correct one, I believe) that there has to be a transcendent reality to serve as the ground of objective morals.

It’s a common complaint of theistic philosophers that most atheists and naturalist non-philosophers routinely conflate epistemology and ontology and completely miss the important philosophical question at issue…and they’re usually correct about this.

Sam Harris does have a background in philosophy, and therefore he doesn’t mistakenly dismiss the ontological question as irrelevant. In fact, in his book The Moral Landscape, he both affirms the existence of objective morality, *and* he expends great intellectual energy trying to ground objective morality and duties in nature–unsuccessfully, IMHO, as he commits the classic naturalistic fallacy.

You can find Craig’s assessment here: http://tinyurl.com/b8e7dtl

FWIW, I think Craig’s criticisms of Harris’ project are valid.

So, rather than close the door on the moral argument, in my opinion you’ve based your essay on a non sequitur, and the door is still very much wide open.

In order to respond to Craig, you would need to successfully attack either of the first two premises of his argument. The first premise seems to me to be rather unassailable (contra Harris). This is why other naturalistic philosophers deny that objective morality really exists (it is, at best, an evolved illusion), but argue that we as a species ought to act as if it does for our own (subjective) sakes. (Rosenberg, Ruse, etc.)

You said: “And from a naturalist’s point of view, morality need not be transcendent or eternal in order to be objective.”

From a naturalist’s point of view it *can’t be*.

“It is, indeed, a different meaning of objective than is typically held, but it meets the requirements: something is morally virtuous whether or not there is anyone who believes it.”

Two things: 1) if you’re defining “objective” differently than Craig, then you’re not really responding to *his* argument. 2) suggesting that moral objectivity can be based on a behavior’s success as an adaptation for a species is, again, the naturalistic fallacy…but it’s what Harris does, so you’re not alone. Defining morality purely in purely naturalistic terms means that moral properties per se do not exist in any objective sense at all…they’re just a different form of language applied to valueless empirical facts…facts such as the successful survival of a species, the amount of physical or emotional pleasure that results from an individual or collective activity.

As I pointed out earlier, it is a subjective and ultimately arbitrary choice to put a higher value on the survival of sentient beings than the unspoiled and unaltered earthly eco-system.

Finally, I hope you weren’t really serious about this one:

“Only the existence of God, for example, could render the act of flying airliners into skyscrapers into a moral virtue.”

Are you really trying to claim that fanatical theists have a monopoly on turning atrocities into virtues? I think that if you replace “God” with non-transcendent authorities like Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, a Hutu militia leader, etc., you get exactly the same thing, but usually at a far more grand scale if there’s some sort of government sponsorship.

What was it Stalin said? “One death is a tragedy; one million is a statistic.” Whether it’s starving Kulaks, some other ideological purge during a cultural revolution, gratuitous torture and cruelty perpetrated on civilians during a war, or a tribal genocide, there’s no shortage of empirical data to illustrate that a merely human authority (issuing non-divine commands) can rationalize any sort of atrocity imaginable into a “moral virtue”, particularly a collective one. So, asserting that morally justifying an atrocity requires the invocation of a deity is false.

It’s worth noting that without a transcendent, objective standard there’s no objective basis on which to condemn such atrocities, whether justified by an appeal to an imaginary divine command or a policy issued by a political party.

Thanks again for the back and forth.

And there are certain kinds of moral virtues that would surely seem to require the existence of some God. For example, without Divine Command Theory, the genocide of the Canaanites, slaughter of Egypt’s firstborn, and the sacrifice of Isaac offend our moral intuitions. Only the existence of God, for example, could render the act of flying airliners into skyscrapers into a moral virtue.

Even if that is Dr. Craig’s argument, I still think that the “properly basic” argument seriously weakens the ontological claim. The reason for that is indicated in my post:

1) If atheism is true, then objective reality cannot exist.
2) Objective reality exists.
3) Therefore, atheism is false.

If we use “properly basic” to justify the second premise, then it seems to me that we need to strengthen our ontological argument in the first premise. This is due to the epistemic features of “properly basic.” Let’s put it this way:

1) Without God, there is no justification for the existence of objective reality
2) Belief in objective reality is properly basic
3) It is rational to hold beliefs that are properly basic, without further justification
4) It is rational to believe in objective reality without further justification (i.e. — God)

In other words, God is not needed as a further justification for objective reality because we do not need to explain how or why objective reality came about in order to believe in it.

The ontological argument, even if true, is utterly superfluous to the existence of objective morality, if belief in objective morality is properly basic.

And from a naturalist’s point of view, morality need not be transcendent or eternal in order to be objective. It is, indeed, a different meaning of objective than is typically held, but it meets the requirements: something is morally virtuous whether or not there is anyone who believes it. Altruistic behavior is a common evolved trait of social animals, providing adaptive benefits to the group even if it is non-adaptive for the individual. If there were no social species exhibiting this trait at any given point in time, it does not follow that altruistic behavior is no longer adaptive. Altruistic behavior is a potential trait of any social group that, upon its emergence, could provide adaptive benefits. In that sense, it is objective (not dependent on the subjective sentiments of conscious beings).

I’m not making a particular case for objective morality, since such a case is not required if we accept the “properly basic” argument. But I think it is important, when considering the ontological argument for God and objective morality to be clear about what sort of moral virtues one is trying to establish as objective. Chances are that the individual is seeking to justify certain virtues that offend our moral intuitions and are not, indeed, properly basic.

Great dialogue! Much appreciated.